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Searching for Economic Balance in Business  
Method Patents∗ 
Keith E. Maskus∗∗ 
Eina Vivian Wong∗∗∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Business method patents (BMPs) award exclusive rights to 
inventors for novel techniques that perform commercial functions not 
embodied in specific physical inventions. These functions include the 
following: delivering services or products to customers; automating 
financial decisions; organizing accounting methods and product 
mixes; and coordinating procurement decisions among input 
suppliers. Thus, BMPs cover many circumstances involving 
straightforward interfaces between customers and firms.1  
Frequently, these novel techniques are expressed in computer 
programs that achieve a particular business application. Indeed, the 
justification for awarding BMPs stems from the recognition that 
functional aspects of software are patentable in the United States. 
Within this area of intellectual property, the following represent the 
four largest categories for which inventors seek protection: operations 
research and market analysis; advertising and other incentives for 
customers to purchase software; exchange of money through credit, 
banking, funds transfer, and the like; and management techniques for 
 
 ∗ This Article was prepared for the 2001 Heart of America Intellectual Property Law 
Conference: “Intellectual Property, Digital Technology, and Electronic Commerce” co-
sponsored by Washington University School of Law on April 6-7, 2001. 
 ∗∗  Professor of Economics, University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado. 
 ∗∗∗ Doctoral candidate in economics, University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado.  
 1.  For example, Walker Digital Corporation owns a patent on the practice of 
“upselling,” in which fast-food restaurant cashiers offer an additional product to customers in 
return for the change from the ordered transaction. See Julia Angwin, Business-Method Patents, 
Key to Priceline, Draw Growing Protest, WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 2000, at B1. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p289 Maskus book pages  10/16/2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
290 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 8:289 
 
 
accounting and inventory control.2 Commercial interests in such 
patents have mushroomed in response to the rapid growth of E-
commerce transactions. Indeed, BMPs are often labeled, somewhat 
misleadingly, “Internet patents.” Due to rapid technical changes and 
volatile product cycles on the Internet, firms often view BMPs as 
essential components for survival and growth.3 
Recent growth in such patents is astonishing. The number of 
BMPs awarded by the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO) rose from 165 in 1996 to 2,193 in 1998.4 The rate of 
issuance for Internet-related patents grew by more than 500% to 
1,595 total patents during fiscal 1997-1998.5 However, one must note 
that applications for BMPs remain a relatively small percentage of 
total patent applications. There were 2,658 BMP applications in 
1999, amounting to only 1% of total patent applications before the 
USPTO.6 
The legal impetus for encouraging the patenting of business 
methods emerged in the State Street decision,7 where the Federal 
Circuit upheld the Signature Financial Group’s patent on the 
company’s “Hub and Spoke” system for making financial resource 
allocations and managing mutual funds.8 In dismissing State Street 
Bank’s claim that the system, as a mathematical abstraction, should 
not have been patented, the court clarified that computerized 
business-management programs meet general patentability criteria 
and are eligible for patent protection.9 Furthermore, the court also 
limited the terms under which mathematical algorithms may be 
 
 2. United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), White Paper, Automated 
Financial or Management Data Processing Methods (Business Methods), at http://www.uspto. 
gov/web/menu/ busmethp/index.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2001). 
 3. See Teresa Riordon, Patents Considered Vital to Thrive on the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 20, 1999, at C39.  
 4. William W. Fisher III, Business Methods Patents Online, at http://eon.law.harvard. 
edu/property00/patents/ main.html (last updated Mar. 10, 2000). 
 5. David L. Hayes, What the General Intellectual Property Practitioner Should Know 
about Patenting Business Methods, at http://eon.law.harvard.edu/h2o/property/patents/Hayes. 
html (last updated Sept. 15, 1999). 
 6. USPTO, supra note 2. 
 7. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 
1998). 
 8. Id. at 1370.  
 9. Id. at 1377.  
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excluded.10 Many legal commentators believe that this decision 
radically expands the scope of patentability for business methods.11 
Others view the result as a natural recognition that business methods 
achieve industrially useful purposes and should be eligible for patent 
protection.12 The latter approach implies that the issue is not one of 
subject-matter excludability, but rather a problem of overcoming the 
particular bars to a patent reward. To do so, an invention must be 
novel, contain an inventive step that is non-obvious to others skilled 
in the same art, and have industrial applications.  
Indeed, the USPTO notes that business methods first attained 
patent protection in 1799 when the United States granted a patent for 
a technique useful in the detection of counterfeit notes.13 In its first 
fifty years, the USPTO granted forty-one BMPs for managing bills of 
credit, checks blanks, interest calculation tables, and other financial 
methods. In 1889, the agency granted its first automated BMP to 
Herman Hollerith, founder of the Tabulating Machine Company, 
which was later renamed International Business Machines, Inc. 
(IBM).14 The USPTO considers the current explosion of BMPs to be 
the result of widespread computing technologies and the growth of 
the Internet rather than the consequence of any change in 
fundamental procedures or definitions. 
Despite this optimistic view, BMPs give rise to heated debate 
among legal scholars and Internet entrepreneurs. Beyond the issue of 
permissible subject matter, settled by State Street, critics raise 
essentially two objections. First, some BMPs appear to be based on 
ideas that can not reasonably be considered novel because similar 
methods have existed in various unprotected forms for some time. 
For example, Priceline.com’s “reverse auction,” in which purchasers 
list a maximum price and the software auctioneer finds a willing 
 
 10. Id. at 1374-76.  
 11. Testimony before the Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House 
of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary Oversight Hearing on the United States Patent 
and Trademark Office, 106th Cong. (2000), available at 2000 WL 282803 (testimony of 
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss) [hereinafater Dreyfuss].  
 12. Jared Earl Grusd, Internet Business Methods: What Role Does and Should Patent Law 
Play?, 4 VA. J.L. & TECH. 9 (1999), at http://www.vjolt.net/vol4/v4i2a9-grusd.html. 
 13. USPTO,  supra note 2.  
 14. Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p289 Maskus book pages  10/16/2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
292 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 8:289 
 
 
supplier, has antecedents in Dutch auctions and other selling 
methods.15 Similarly, Barnes & Noble contested the validity of 
Amazon’s “one-click” patent on the grounds that other techniques 
involving a single operation by the consumer, contingent on the 
seller’s ability to identify the consumer uniquely, were in operation 
prior to the patent’s issuance in 1999.16 Ten years ago, for example, 
CompuServe permitted users to purchase stock-price graphs by 
pushing an on-screen button.  
Second, many patents cover remarkably broad claims that could 
permit patentees to exclude competition in a wide swath of Internet 
applications. A prominent example of this class is a Sightsound.com 
patent. The company claims that the patent covers all electronic 
means for distributing digital audio or video recordings over the 
Internet. With such protection lasting twenty years from the date of 
application, the company will have a commanding position in 
electronic distribution, an expanding sector of the economy, and may 
exercise that power to stifle competition. In brief, BMPs are 
controversial because they provide broad and lengthy exclusivity for 
inventions that may not be particularly novel or non-obvious. 
Naturally, the question arises of whether the protection of 
methods for organizing business will invite entrepreneurs in other 
areas of “cerebral subject matter” to demand patents. Presumably, it 
is now possible to patent computerized methods of instruction 
involving techniques for combining video-taped lectures, online data 
retrieval, and interactive questioning into a single format. If so, it is 
difficult to see why new instructional methods aimed solely at the 
classroom would not qualify for patent protection. If someone were 
to write a program that instantaneously transmitted electronic 
versions of economics graphs from an overhead projector or 
computerized projection to the notebook computers of students, could 
she not patent it and insist on earning royalties from anyone who 
employed such projections? Suppose that a pitching coach on a 
 
 15. Grusd, supra note 12, at ¶ 29. 
 16. The Federal Circuit agreed that “substantial questions” existed about the validity of 
Amazon’s patent and removed the injunction against the use of a one-click system by Barnes 
and Noble. Amazon.com, Inc. v. BarnesandNoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 
2001). 
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minor-league baseball team developed an effective new pitch, the 
“split-fingered curveball.” Perhaps the pitch itself would not be 
eligible for a patent,17 but the coach should be able to protect his 
instructional technique. If the claim was sufficiently broad, 
instructors at all levels would need to license the technique in order to 
use the pitch itself.  
Perhaps because of the novel and intangible nature of business 
methods, BMPs commanded little attention from economists, even 
though legal scholars have covered selected economic issues 
implicated by BMPs in qualitative terms.18 In this paper, we hope to 
shed some light on the issue by considering economic arguments for 
awarding patents for business concepts. Many of these arguments 
focus on the wisdom of broad and exclusive rights in sectors that are 
critical for economic growth, where innovation is dynamic and 
incremental, and where standards and network effects are significant. 
In our view, economic analysis cannot support the BMP system as it 
currently operates. This conclusion is buttressed by the limited 
empirical evidence available for BMPs.19 In brief, the patent system 
is imbalanced in favor of inventors to the detriment of the public 
good. Thus, Congress and the USPTO should significantly modify 
the standards and procedures for granting and enforcing business 
method patents.  
In Part II of this Article, we briefly discuss the structural problems 
in U.S. patent law that lead to excessive protection. In Part III, we 
analyze various economic aspects of BMPs and review some relevant 
empirical experience. Part IV is devoted to proposals for reform. 
Finally, Part V provides the conclusion. 
 
 17. A pitch may be patentable if it is novel and industrially useful and meets a low non-
obvious standard. See Dreyfuss, supra note 11 (alluding to the patentability of a baseball pitch). 
For an early description of how patented football plays could affect competition in the National 
Football League, see generally J. Michael Finger, The Uruguay Round Comes to the NFL (Dec. 
2, 1988) (manuscript, on file with author). 
 18. See generally Grusd, supra note 12; Dreyfuss, supra note 11; Robert P. Merges, As 
Many as Six Impossible Patents before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and 
Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577 (1999). 
 19. See infra Part III.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
p289 Maskus book pages  10/16/2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
294 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 8:289 
 
 
II. STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS IN BUSINESS-METHODS PATENT 
Much of the concern about BMPs stems from shortcomings in the 
process by which the USPTO awards those patents. Significant 
problems exist with the examination system itself. First, despite 
recent increases in staff, there are so few patent examiners that each 
application must be handled quickly, with only a minimal search for 
prior art. Examiners tend to take the prior art listed in patent 
applications at face value and have insufficient time and resources to 
engage in more thorough searches.20 Such pressures induce 
examiners to dispose of cases quickly. Moreover, examiners trained 
as engineers and scientists may lack the economic and business 
expertise necessary for evaluating the novelty of these inventions.  
Second, the formal stock of prior art itself is quite limited because 
the USPTO did not issue many Internet patents before the mid-
1990s.21 Software and business methods traditionally relied on 
copyrights and trade secrets protection, neither of which provide 
formal disclosure of their technical aspects.22  
Application of the non-obviousness requirement may also raise 
significant issues of patentability. As Grusd stated when describing 
the Priceline.com patent: 
The issuance of this patent implies that it would not be obvious 
for a firm to take any standard business practice and apply it to 
the Internet. Such a loose interpretation of the nonobviousness 
doctrine implies that the nonobviousness requirement is no 
longer being used as a significant bar on commonplace 
inventions.23 
Furthermore, the absence of case law clarifying the standards that 
must apply to Internet business techniques leaves a vacuum for 
examiners who rely on patenting procedures that evolved in the 
context of tangible devices.24 Finally, existing practice suggests that it 
 
 20. Id.  
 21. USPTO, supra note 2. 
 22. See Keith E. Maskus, Intellectual Property Rights in the Global Economy 
(Washington D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 2000) at 44-47, 59-60. 
 23. Grusd, supra note 12, at ¶ 29. 
 24. See generally Grusd, supra note 12. 
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is possible to program a computer to do something that is already in 
familiar social practice and patent the technique. This fact should 
remarkably shrink the required size of the inventive step. 
If BMPs are issued with excessive breadth and questionable 
adherence to patentability requirements, they may be invalidated 
when the patentee attempts to judicially enforce her rights or as a 
result of re-examination proceedings. However, the American system 
is unusual in the zeal with which it raises obstacles to such 
challenges. First, the USPTO does not make patent applications 
publicly available until patents are awarded, thus precluding any 
possibility of early disclosure and pre-grant opposition proceedings.25 
Consequently, patents may only be revoked upon private party 
challenges. In itself, this procedure is costly and encourages 
complainants to settle before the re-examination is complete and 
accept licensing agreements. Second, the Federal Circuit erected a 
high bar to successful contests by ruling that issued patents are 
presumed valid unless challengers present clear and convincing 
evidence of error.26 That is, complainants must believe that it is 
highly probable that a patent is invalid, in order to justify the cost of 
litigation. The Supreme Court solidified this standard in Dickinson v. 
Zurko,27 holding that the Federal Circuit may reverse the USPTO’s 
factual determinations “only when its findings are arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or unsupported by substantial 
evidence.”28 
We may finally note that the USPTO itself sees its role as one of 
helping inventors win patents, rather than one of balancing public 
interests among invention, commercialization, and dissemination.29 
This policy raises serious concerns about the level of commercial 
influence on the patenting process. 
 
 25. See Keith E. Maskus, Canadian Patent Policy in the North American Context, May 
23-24, 2001, at 5 (paper prepared for the Conference Intellectual Property and Innovation in the 
Knowledge-Based Economy, sponsored by Industry Canada).  
 26. Dreyfuss, supra note 11, at 2.  
 27. 527 U.S. 150 (1999). 
 28. Dreyfuss, supra note 11, at 2.  
 29. See Brian Kahin, The Expansion of the Patent System: Politics and Political Economy, 
FIRST MONDAY (Jan. 2001), at http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue6_1/kahin/index.html. 
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III. ECONOMICS OF BUSINESS-METHODS PATENTS 
At a basic level, the economic arguments for issuing BMPs are no 
different from those supporting protection for any other technology. 
Exclusive rights provide market advantages that encourage 
investment of time and effort in developing new and better 
techniques for organizing business. Such inventions, including their 
incorporation into applications software, may incur considerable 
research and development costs. Rival firms may easily appropriate 
the fruits of this labor in an environment of weak protection.  
Property rights provide a level of legal certainty that permits 
inventors to commercialize their inventions through licensing and 
direct sales. Patent grants ensure disclosure of the technical 
information necessary to spur additional innovation. However, such 
exclusive rights bear the costs of restricting market access, supporting 
monopoly prices, and potentially providing the technical ability to 
block follow-up innovation. The extent of these costs depends on the 
scope of patent protection, especially the breadth of the claims 
recognized, as well as any limitations on the exploitation of rights 
that may ensue from competition regulation. 
In the qualitative context, it is difficult to see a compelling 
economic argument that would support a blanket proscription against 
issuing BMPs. The claim that business methods are inherently mental 
constructions involving organizational techniques, more akin to 
unpatentable discoveries or algorithms than to tangible inventions, is 
not an economic argument. Many business methods do involve sweat 
of the brow, novelty, and inventiveness. Moreover, evidence suggests 
that an important component of technical progress is the simple 
reorganization within firms of processes such as accounting and 
quality control.30 To the extent that entrepreneurs develop new 
methods for efficiently organizing production and ensuring delivery 
to consumers, one may raise a utilitarian argument for protecting 
those methods. 
It would appear, therefore, that the issue is not whether business 
 
 30. See generally Robert E. Evenson & Larry E. Westphal, Technological Change and 
Technology Strategy, in 3A HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, at 2227-46 (Jere 
Behrman & T.N. Srinivasan eds., 1995). 
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methods should be considered protectable subject matter. Rather, 
policy makers must determine if the current patent system over-
protects inventors to such an extent that it threatens to slow down 
competition and the dynamic creation of business techniques, 
particularly on the Internet. Economists have long questioned the 
“one size fits all” approach of the U.S. patent regime, which largely 
fails to tailor its protection to specific fields of technology in terms of 
fundamental market characteristics. As we argue in this section, 
Internet business methods bear important dynamic characteristics that 
strongly question the wisdom of lengthy and broad protection. In 
conjunction with the structural problems discussed in the last section, 
we find the imbalance between inventor rights and the public good to 
be significant and worthy of attention. 
A. What are the Economic Stakes? 
Business methods essentially accomplish two types of goals. First, 
they reduce costs and raise productivity by finding improved 
techniques for managing processes, typically of a financial nature. 
Such management may be done within a firm or by contractors. 
Second, business methods reduce transaction costs between firms and 
consumers, largely through the Internet. Both types of innovation 
may be adopted comprehensively across industries, both through the 
use of general technologies and the development of numerous 
industry-specific applications. Thus, the potential coverage for any 
new business method is huge because they are inherently general and 
cross-sectoral in nature.  
E-commerce remains a dynamic and rapidly growing sector 
despite the recent correction in stock valuations and the inevitable 
shakeout of inefficient firms. The Internet has penetrated business 
and home operations on a global scale with remarkable speed; it took 
only four years for the Internet to reach 50 million users.31 One 
analyst projects that by the year 2005, E-commerce transactions in 
the United States alone could exceed $6 trillion, though other 
 
 31. See CATHERINE MANN, GLOBAL ELECTRONIC COMMERCE: A POLICY PRIMER 13-17 
(2000). 
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estimates are far smaller.32 More importantly, 90% of U.S. firms 
already claim that E-commerce will soon affect how they do 
business, demonstrating the wide applicability of this technology. 
Analysts anticipate the growth of E-commerce to be particularly large 
in business-to-business transactions, as it provides the ability to 
source inputs across borders.  
Viewed in economic terms, E-commerce is a powerful tool for 
integrating markets by reducing distribution costs between 
enterprises and consumers as well as suppliers and producers. Given 
the high costs of traditional distribution methods, the Internet is very 
likely to enjoy extensive expansion as a channel for commercial 
activity. As with any other distribution technology, however, 
industries must develop efficient protocols for communication, 
ordering, payment, and delivery. At its core, this is what E-commerce 
strives for: business methods that efficiently conjoin the interests of 
consumers and firms to achieve commercial success. The analytical 
question is whether patents are a boon or a hindrance to this 
development. 
B. Fundamental Economic Characteristics 
Business methods patents are controversial in large part because 
of certain basic characteristics of the inventions they protect. First, 
methods are processes for achieving certain tasks and outcomes, such 
as information collection and preference identification, that may find 
application across a wide array of business activity. In that sense, 
they differ fundamentally from inventions aimed at solving a specific 
engineering problem. Accordingly, patentees may seek exceptionally 
broad protection, covering all potential applications and excluding 
rivals from developing, even with significant independent effort, 
techniques for achieving the same end.33  
Second, business methods often appear to be familiar commercial 
practices that are applied to electronic markets simply by their 
 
 32. Id. at 16. We list it here only to illustrate the optimistic projections that exist for this 
sector. See discussion infra Part IV (noting that this estimate is wildly inflated). 
 33. Thus, they are like research tools in biotechnology, which have also attracted criticism 
for their wide scope.  
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incorporation into computer programs. It is a stretch to claim that 
Amazon.com’s single-click patent or Priceline.com’s reverse-auction 
patent reward true novelty in the area of business methods. Rather 
such methods extend software to the patent realm that would 
ordinarily rely on market lead time, copyrights, and trade secrets for 
protection. This situation rewards a thin edge of creation with a thick 
wedge of protection. At the same time, advocates of BMPs argue that 
software copyrights are easy to improve upon and that computer 
programs cannot be effectively safeguarded by trade secrets. In that 
context, failing to reward patents would eviscerate the business 
method invention that gives rise to the computer program. 
Third, many of the processes and services that BMPs attempt to 
sort out are rapidly evolving and subject to short life cycles. E-mail 
protocols, electronic purchasing, downloading technologies, Web site 
design architectures, and computerized investment-management 
strategies are all examples of processes that are new and subject to 
continuous evolution. Entry into the markets that provide such 
services is relatively straightforward because consumer preferences 
shift rapidly and protocols and processes are overtaken in the 
marketplace.  
In such a dynamic and uncertain environment, process developers 
need to establish product loyalty through quality differentiation, cost 
advantages, or other means of distinguishing themselves from 
competitors. It is evident that the more lasting a commercial 
advantage is perceived to be, the more readily capital markets will 
finance its development and improvement. Thus, it is of little surprise 
that venture capitalists working in E-commerce place high value on 
the apparent security of Internet patents. Many participants in the E-
commerce and information technology sectors view BMPs as crucial 
to their survival and growth as commercial entities.34  
A fourth characteristic of business methods, at least as they are 
commercialized through the Internet and software, is that they may 
accentuate and solidify network effects. In economic parlance, a 
network externality exists when the advantages of joining an 
information-technology network, or purchasing a particular piece of 
 
 34. Riordan, supra note 3. 
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software, rise with the number of users.35 The benefits may be as 
simple as enjoying increased communications with people, but there 
are also technological and pecuniary gains. Users prefer interoperable 
software and communication protocols to share work files. Larger 
networks attract complementary software which improves 
connections and, being subject to economies of scale, reduce 
computing costs. 
Network economies have potentially important impacts on 
competition. Significant advantages accrue because of the associated 
declining costs and rising demand to those suppliers that can expand 
their “installed base” of users most rapidly. Once a network or 
program achieves a critical size, it is possible for users in other 
systems to switch to the network in rapid succession, potentially 
destroying competitors. Many analysts believe this “tipping effect,” 
and the tendency for users to get locked into the use of a single 
network or software standard, is a source of considerable market 
power.  
Since business methods are complementary to network 
technologies, they may enhance these impacts. Suppose that 
individuals benefiting from an Internet connection also prefer the 
service of electronic shopping arcades. The benefit of visiting an 
arcade increases with its size. For example, size could be important to 
electronic booksellers if they utilize their market power to convince 
publishers to allow the availability of catalogues through their 
medium, either exclusively or through a non-exclusive licensing 
contract. Perceiving the available catalogues and browsing 
opportunities to be greater with larger electronic booksellers, 
consumers may often be “tipped” into visiting the largest outlet (or 
bookseller), thereby further raising its scale. Even a seemingly small 
convenience bestowed on a particular competitor, such as a one-step 
checkout procedure, would enhance this possibility by appealing to 
consumers.  
It is in this area that BMPs present their most significant change in 
fundamental business models and challenge to dynamic competition. 
Traditional retailing involves discrete visits of consumers to different 
 
 35. See CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE 
TO THE NETWORK ECONOMY 12-14 (1999). 
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locations. In that environment, it makes little sense to patent methods 
of selling because any commercial gains would be exceeded by 
extensive transactional costs in securing and monitoring patent 
compliance.  
Electronic selling, however, is quite different. Determining the 
similarity of retailing (or wholesaling or licensing) methods among 
rivals is straightforward for firms because transactions are handled 
through the Internet. Combined with the potential for large returns 
associated with network effects, the Internet has greatly increased the 
private gains to BMPs while reducing their costs of implementation 
and enforcement. Moreover, a broad patent, with comprehensive 
appeal issued for a distribution technique, poses a considerable entry 
barrier for second comers. This condition is problematic for 
competition in direct terms and may also encourage ultimate sellers, 
such as publishers, music companies, and input suppliers, to arrange 
their Internet sales through protected methods.  
C. BMPs and the Stimulation of Invention 
In State Street, the Federal Circuit clarified that business methods 
are patentable, and the relevant issue is whether they attain the 
standards for receiving protection. This strict legal interpretation 
remains consistent with the American notion that virtually anything 
that may be invented by humankind is patentable.36  
The ruling, however, pays no attention to the economics of BMPs. 
A utilitarian calculation would question whether the promise of 
patent protection induces a flow of invented business methods which 
are placed in commercial practice and that generate a surplus of 
social benefits over costs. A series of questions arise with this issue.  
First, are BMPs necessary to promote invention and the 
commercialization of business techniques on the Internet? If not, then 
providing exclusive rights for inventions that would be developed in 
any event becomes socially wasteful. No direct evidence pertains to 
this question and we do not believe a definitive answer exists. Many 
commentators point to surveys of U.S. enterprise managers regarding 
the impact of potential patent protection on research and development 
 
 36. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980). 
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programs.37 These surveys find that, except for a few research-
intensive industries with easily imitated technologies such as 
pharmaceuticals and biotechnology, firms rank patents well behind 
natural market advantages, such as first-mover advantages, lead times 
in building market loyalty, and trade secrets. Unfortunately, these 
surveys were conducted before the onset of widespread patenting of 
business methods in the late 1990s. If the surveys were replicated, the 
new findings may bring into serious question the existence of social 
gains from BMPs. We would anticipate, however, that given the 
characteristics discussed above regarding business methods, 
practitioners would claim they view patents as critical for earning 
returns and attracting capital. Such answers would be of positive 
interest only if they demonstrate no net social gains to BMPs. 
An alternative method of analysis is to contrast innovation 
experiences between countries with different forms of intellectual 
property protection. Unfortunately, such a study would presently be 
premature because no other country has advanced as far as the United 
States in recognizing BMPs. The European Patent Office (EPO) 
recently moved toward a more expansive view of patentability from 
its prior insistence that business methods lack technical character and, 
therefore, could not be patented. The EPO now recognizes that 
embodiment in a computer technology provides sufficient technical 
basis for an invented business method.38 In the last two years, the 
number of applications for BMPs at the EPO has doubled, totaling 
approximately 400 in the year 2000.39 Additionally, the Japanese 
Patent Office (JPO) issued guidelines concerning its treatment of 
BMPs in 2000.40 While it clearly recognizes the patentability of 
business method inventions, the JPO proposes to enforce a higher 
standard than does the USPTO. Specifically, application of the 
standard would deny patent protection when the invention may be 
 
 37. See Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns to Industrial Research and 
Development, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 783 (1987). 
 38. EUROPEAN PATENT ORGANIZATION’S ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL, Report on the 80th 
Meeting of the Administrative Council of the European Patent Organization, 7 O.J. 307-09 
(2000). 
 39. Id. 
 40. JAPANESE PATENT OFFICE, Policies Concerning Business Method Patents, at 
http://www.jpo-miti.go.jp/saikine/tt1211-056.htm (last modified Nov. 30, 2000). 
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easily conceived through combining publicly known methods with 
common techniques in business and knowledge of standard computer 
technology.41 It will be interesting to observe how companies 
compete in the BMPs area under these differing regimes. 
Because a direct comparison of national standards is not feasible, 
a look at indirect evidence may be illustrative, though hardly 
definitive. One approach is to consider the nature and pace of 
innovation in countries other than the United States where BMPs are 
not protected or are done so under different terms. One important 
purpose of BMPs is to protect computer programs that affect a 
particular business application, such as bookkeeping methods, 
financial consulting, medical-records management, and electronic 
auctions. Recent field research in China and Lebanon, where 
software was barely protected by copyrights and remains ineligible 
for patents, turned up the interesting similarity that in both countries 
there was a thriving industry devoted to developing business-
applications software.42 Competition was built on open-source 
protocols among software firms, with each firm attempting to 
develop a niche product. Programmers interviewed in China and 
Lebanon pointed to the importance of open standards that could be 
freely studied. Indeed, this business model is consistent with 
economic analysis of the gains to open-source programming in 
industries where no firm has a dominant position and all firms at 
times are information creators and at times need to be information 
borrowers.43 
A second example relevant to the debate over BMPs is that the 
structure of the Japanese Patent System (JPS) from 1960-1994 
significantly contributed to technical change and productivity growth 
 
 41. Id. at 2. 
 42. See Keith E. Maskus et al., Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Development 
in China, at http://www.nbr.org/regional_studies/ipr/chongquin98/maskus_essay.html (last 
visited Mar. 22, 2001); Keith E. Maskus, Strengthening Intellectual Property Rights in 
Lebanon, in CATCHING UP WITH THE COMPETITION 251 (Bernard Hoekman & Jamel Zarrouk 
eds., 2000).  
 43. See generally JOSH LERNER & JEAN TIROLE, THE SIMPLE ECONOMICS OF OPEN 
SOURCE (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7600, 2000), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers.w7600. These authors note that several major information- 
technology firms have launched projects to develop and use open-source software, suggesting 
that access to capital may not be a significant problem. 
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in the Japanese economy.44 The JPS was characterized by early patent 
disclosure, the possibility of pre-grant opposition, and the availability 
of utility models for protecting small-scale, incremental innovations 
with a lesser inventive step. Under this system, which clearly favored 
diffusion of new technical information into the Japanese economy 
over fundamental invention, Japanese enterprises successfully 
advanced technical knowledge and developed that knowledge into 
marketable products.45 These small inventions supported extensive 
systems of cross-licensing. This history shows that in an environment 
of dynamic competition based on small adaptations of technology to 
specific uses, relatively weak protection does not necessarily limit 
entrepreneurial incentives. Indeed, recent literature suggests that 
weak protection may be advantageous for initiating a sequential 
system of innovation and may build complementary relationships 
among products.46 In such sectors, strong patents may slow down 
innovation and reduce joint industry profits in the long run. 
It is questionable whether this evidence implicates BMPs as 
unnecessary and protectionist. The United States is different from 
China, Lebanon, and Japan. Additionally, competition to developing 
new business methods is not the same as competition in software. 
Nonetheless, the parallels in the development of BMPs and software 
are worth considering. If BMPs tend to be incremental inventions 
with little inventiveness or novelty, patents may protect rents without 
creating social value for consumers and avoiding industrial progress. 
D. Potential Effects of BMPs 
While the preceding comparison is instructive, the jury is still out 
on whether some BMPs could support advances in productivity, 
product diversity and the development of electronic markets. It is 
easy to confuse the Internet, a medium supporting a global web of 
 
 44. See Keith E. Maskus & Christine McDaniel, Impacts of the Japanese Patent System 
on Productivity Growth, 11 JAPAN AND THE WORLD ECON. 557 (1999). 
 45.  See generally id. 
 46. See generally JAMES BESSEN & ERIC MASKIN, SEQUENTIAL INNOVATION, PATENTS, 
AND IMITATION (Mass. Inst. of Tech., Working Paper No. 00-01, 2000); Jerome Reichman, Of 
Green Tulips and Legal Kudzu: Repackaging Rights in Subpatentable Invention, 53 VAND. L. 
REV. 1776-78 (2000). 
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communications, with E-commerce, which is the use of that medium 
for conducting market transactions. The fact that the former 
technology rapidly expanded in an environment of open access and 
market-generated standards does not imply that E-commerce markets 
will achieve maturity without definition and protection of property 
rights. Indeed, despite predictions of remarkable growth in E-
commerce in the short term, such transactions remain a relatively 
small component of distribution in the developed countries and have 
barely penetrated markets in less developed countries.47  
Therefore, it is possible that E-commerce could expand even 
faster if BMPs created incentives for developing and 
commercializing techniques that support orderly marketing on the 
Internet. Such techniques would include methods for enhancing 
security, permitting consumers to select and transfer electronic files 
and payments, supporting firms in calculations of optimal purchasing 
programs from competing input suppliers, and allowing clients to 
compute beneficial mixes of financial instruments. Efficient licensing 
of protected inventions could support the development of electronic 
markets, both domestically and internationally. 
Against this sanguine possibility, policy makers must weigh the 
significant potential for anti-competitive uses of patent rights 
associated with network impacts and standards as discussed above. 
While it is unlikely that many BMPs would support more than 
marginal levels of market power, patents that protect selling methods 
or research protocols with widespread application could be the source 
of long-lasting monopolization. Such monopolization may assert 
itself in several forms of anti-competitive behavior, including refusals 
to license, extension of market power from the business method itself 
to product markets through exclusive arrangements, and restraints on 
 
 47. Note that the estimate provided earlier that E-commerce would reach $6 trillion by 
2005 is surely inflated. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. Total sales by manufacturing, 
retail, and wholesale trade firms in the United States amounted to perhaps $9.7 trillion in 2000, 
with the trade component being perhaps $5.5 trillion. Assuming that these figures grow by 3% 
annually between 2000 and 2005, the comparable figures for the latter year would be $11.2 
trillion and $6.4 trillion, respectively. Thus, for E-commerce sales to reach $6 trillion, they 
would need to take up 54% of gross sales of all goods and 94% of sales in the trade sector. The 
latter estimate could only imply a massive collapse of traditional retailing and wholesaling, 
which seems unlikely within four years. See generally COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS, 
ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT (1998).  
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entry through pre-emptive threats and litigation. In turn, BMPs might 
slow down innovation and restrain growth of the Internet and E-
commerce. This potential is significant in the presence of broad 
patent protection, which seems an unduly generous reward for little 
true innovation. 
An additional problem with BMPs is that, where invention costs 
are small in relation to the substantial rewards from exclusivity, 
BMPs may generate wasteful patent races and rent seeking. 
Moreover, firms that wish to develop or use competing technologies 
must engage in costly searches into the coverage of existing patents 
to avoid infringement.48 Finally, to the extent that investment capital 
flows into firms on the basis of a protected market position rather 
than new innovation, firm survival may be based more on the 
attainment of BMPs than dynamic competition.49 
IV. POLICY ANALYSIS 
The following policy initiatives are particularly worthy of 
consideration and debate. Not all changes are feasible within the 
constraints of the current system and the WTO Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). In 
particular, it is problematic to envision a separate patent regime for 
BMPs, even considering the particular characteristics of business 
methods.  
 
 48. See 10 European Industry Leaders Raise Concerns about Software Patents, LINUX 
WKLY. NEWS (June 19, 1999), available at http://lwn.net/1999/0624/a/10leaders.html. 
 49. We doubt the significance of this factor to date on the Internet. To illustrate, between 
October 1999, the date at which Amazon.com’s “one-click patent” was issued, and July 2000 
the price of Amazon’s Internet stock fell by 61% while that of Barnes and Noble’s Internet 
stock fell by 68%–hardly a decisive difference. If the price decline were measured from 
December 1999, when the restraining order was issued, the Amazon price decline becomes 
larger than the Barnes and Noble price decline. A more informative study would be to look for 
unusually large relative changes in these stock prices in the days before and after the patent was 
awarded and the injunction was issued. 
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A. Examinations and Funding 
The USPTO could achieve considerable improvement in its 
examination procedures if examiners were more attentive to relevant 
prior art and were able to search beyond patent applications for 
evidence that inventions are not novel or obvious. The agency should 
not award patents to ideas that were already known and in use in 
other forms of business if the invention submitted simply proffers a 
new format, on the grounds that such inventions are obvious. The 
patent office needs more examiners so that each may devote more 
time to individual applications. Additionally, examiners need to be 
better skilled in business arts. It is evident that more critical 
examination procedures would lead to a significant reduction in 
BMPs issuances. 
B. Opposition Proceedings and Validity Challenges 
It is remarkable that the United States permits no effective 
opposition proceedings prior to patent grants. To facilitate more 
effective opposition procedures, the USPTO could consider earlier 
disclosure of applications for BMPs.50 Concerning patent challenges, 
the bias in favor of validity elucidated by the courts seems excessive 
in its caution because it creates significant costs to litigation and 
encourages filing for broad claims on slim inventions.  
C. Patent Scope and Duration 
The patent system encourages excessively broad claims, often 
covering potentially wide arrays of business competition. Examiners 
could be encouraged to approve claims for protection only on the 
particular applications for which the invention is developed, to the 
extent such limitations may be identified, and require full disclosure 
of the technical details. At the litigation stage, courts could examine 
claims more carefully for excessive breadth.  
 
 50. See Dan Johnson & David Popp, The Timing of Patent Disclosure and the Size of 
Innovation 22 (Nov. 17, 1999) (manuscript, on file with author) (arguing that the dissemination 
benefits of early disclosure outweight the possible costs in terms of innovation). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p289 Maskus book pages  10/16/2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
308 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 8:289 
 
 
Given the difficulty of achieving the task of precise identification 
of uses, however, an appropriate alternative would be to limit the 
length of protection to a period far less than twenty years. It is 
evident that such a change would require renegotiation of the TRIPS 
accord, unless it were achieved through a system of utility models. 
Finally, the potentially broad scope of protection granted by BMPs in 
their current guise underscores that anti-trust authorities need to be 
vigilant in disciplining anti-competitive behavior that threatens to 
stifle innovation on the Internet. 
V. CONCLUSION 
A review of the logical arguments and limited evidence 
supporting BMPs available leads to the following conclusion. As 
currently structured, business-methods patents do not strike an 
appropriate balance between the economic interests they implicate. 
The system favors the USPTO granting extensive property rights to 
inventions of limited non-obviousness and questionable novelty. This 
conclusion does not suggest that the United States should render 
business methods unpatentable. Rather, it urges a critical 
consideration of the patent system with a view of moving it towards a 
more balanced set of incentives.51  
 
 51. Dreyfuss, supra note 11 (advocating the elimination of BMPs); see also Lawrence 
Lessig, Online Patents: Leave Them Pending, WALL ST. J., Mar. 23, 2000, at A22; James 
Gleick, Patently Absurd, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 12, 2000, at 44. But see Grusd, supra note 12 
(favoring reform based on the precedent of special treatment for biotechnology patents). 
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